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Wessel Reijers criticises the Chinese Social Credit System for two reasons. Firstly,
because it cannot promote virtuous actions. According to the Aristotelian tradition
to which Reijers refers, virtuous actions cannot be determined by the pursuit of
reputation, money, pleasure, etc. Acting virtuously is not acting according to social
conventions, but ‘standing out distinguishing oneself.’ Secondly, the Social Credit
System denies the principle of virtuous governance by creating a master-slave
relation between government and citizens that undermines the Greek-Western
principle of political freedom.
The Illusion of Political Freedom
The thesis I propose is that the reason why the Social Credit System so scandalises
Westerners is not because it is contrary to ‘our’ Aristotelian and Arendtian liberal
political tradition. Rather, it is precisely because it shows the illusion upon which this
tradition is founded. This consists in believing that there is a void at our disposal
between people as ‘free’ citizens and the political as a set of laws.
Imagine that there was a large empty square, the mythical Athenian agora – not the
real one, in which there were at least twenty buildings and structures, each with its
complex access and behaviour rituals. Imagine further the mythical Athenian citizens
– no children, women, or slaves. In this mythical empty square, supported by a few
basic rules, virtuous action entirely depends on the single citizen’s free will.
The Social Credit System scandalises Westerners because it shows that such an
ideal type does not exist. On the one hand, no political or social actor acts virtuously,
at least if by virtue one means the self-contained search for the eudaimonia. On the
other hand, all governments, at least from the 16th century, have tried to fill the gap
between the laws of government and the governmental practices by making rules
more granular. These are the two points I want to explain further.
The Absence of Disinterestedness
Firstly, I am convinced that there is no disinterested action, neither in political acting,
nor in other forms of acting and speaking. Human acts are always ‘interested’, which
means that one plays a social game only if she believes that the game is worth
playing.1)Bourdieu, P. (1998). ‘Is a Disinterested Act Possible?’ In: Bourdieu, P.,
Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
pp. 75-91, p. 77. Being interested in a specific social game is not the result of cold
calculation. On the contrary, it rather implies a belief in its value, and it also means
ultimately forgetting the game qua game. According to this perspective, virtuous is
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a person who best acts according to the implicit rules of a social game he or she is
playing. 
According to the Aristotelian model of civic virtue, a virtuous person aims to act
without being influenced by the pursuit of ambition, money, or reputation. But this
same virtuous action is in fact determined by a series of rules that do not arise
from the individual herself, but from the definition that a certain tradition has given,
which in the Western context is primarily the liberal tradition. The act of believing
in this conception of virtue, and of reiterating the same rules, leads to the creation
of a certain habitus, a form of acting, thinking, and desiring common to all the
people educated at the school of the Aristotelian and liberal tradition. This allows
the participant to this specific game to recognise, appreciate, and judge each other
according to the best and the worst, etc. The Social Credit System does nothing
different, but it does so by starting from another premise; it privileges, probably for
historical and cultural reasons, social conventions rather than the standing out from
the mass. 
Incidentally, I think, as Jens van ‘t Klooster underlines, that Western societies
are already full of indicators that publicly signal our value as members of a liberal
society. I do not mean by that that, by centralising the ‘rules of the game,’ the
Social Credit System is fairer. Instead, it is based on dynamics of domination,
discrimination, and social exclusion (for instance, in terms of access to basic
services such as education, health, and food). Furthermore, the Social Credit
System does not show the intention to compensate for injustices – for example,
by giving more credit for ‘virtuous’ actions carried out by those coming from the
segments of the populations that are least favoured in economic and cultural terms.
Weak Normativity
As for the government, the Belgian political theorist Thomas Berns affirmed that at
least from the 16th-century two forms of normativity have been pursued.2)Berns,
T. (2009). Gouverner sans gouverner: une archéologie politique de la statistique.
Paris: PUF. First, the normativity of the laws, which however is often too abstract
and detached from concrete citizens’ actions. Second, the ‘discrete’ and ‘weak’
normativity of numbers and quantification of the population. 
The purpose of this second form of normativity is not to sanction crimes, but to
correct small infractions and deviant behaviours. ‘De minimis non curat lex’, ‘the
law does not concern itself with trifles’, and for this reason another normativity is
needed to deal with such trifles. Berns refers especially to the works of the French
political jurist and philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and to the manner in which
he, with other thinkers of that century, rehabilitated a non-Greek, but a Roman form
of politics, in particular the figure of the Roman censor. The normative action of
the censor derived exclusively from his administrative practice. His decisions did
not imply punishments, but forms of downgrading. The effectiveness of his activity
mostly lied in provoking ‘blushing’ – ruborem is the Latin word used by Cicero. This
form of normativity became more and more important as states developed statistics
and other methodologies for the government of their populations.
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The Social Credit System is not so different from what Bodin had in mind. It is the
same matter of developing and practising a normativity, whose strength is not that
of the law, but rather of a mode of quantification that better adheres to the reality
and whose force depends precisely on this adherence. It is a more granular kind of
normativity, whose main goal is to occupy the empty room for manoeuvring that the
law is incapable of occupying. The Social Credit System does not aim (at least, not
primarily) to punish individuals, but to bring them to the self-correction and the self-
control over their habits, behaviours, and actions. Its ultimate scope is to intervene
where the law cannot, that is, in the diffused corruption of the mores that afflict
contemporary Chinese society.
The techniques and technologies at disposal to the Chinese government are very
different from those that states had at disposal until a few years ago. It must also
be acknowledged that in the Roman tradition to which Bodin referred, the censor
was well distinguished from the legislator, while in the case of the Social Credit
System the two regimes of normativity are merged. However, I wonder if this does
not correspond precisely to what has already happened for a long time in Western
democracies. We are scandalised by the Chinese Social Credit System not because
it is contrary to ‘our’ political tradition, but because it brings forward the grey zone
about which we usually prefer to delude ourselves.
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